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1. Introduction
The association between shareholder level taxa-
tion and the structure of corporate takeovers has
received a great deal of attention in prior research.
In the UK, where equity is received as payment 
in a takeover, section 135 of the Taxation of
Chargeable Gains Act 1992 allows target firm
shareholders to defer any capital gain to the subse-
quent disposal of the acquiring firm’s shares. In
contrast, where payment is received as cash, target
shareholders are immediately taxable on any capi-
tal gain.1 Similar taxation arrangements exist in
the US under section 368 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The immediate taxable status where cash is
offered as payment has led to the expectation
(Erickson, 1998 and Dinnison, 2000) that acquir-
ing firms will be less likely to use cash where tar-
get shareholders have a greater liability for capital
gains tax (CGT). However, previous studies in
Europe (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) have been un-
able to find any association between the choice of
payment method and the taxation treatment of tar-
get shareholders. Similarly, US studies have found
no association between the acquiring firm’s
method of payment choice and proxies for the size
of target shareholder capital gains (Erickson,
1998; Ayers et al., 2004). Ayers et al. (2004) do,
however, document a greater use of equity pay-
ment during periods of higher CGT rates in the US
but find no association with proxies for the size of
target shareholder capital gains.
In contrast to the US and UK and prior to 10
December 1999, in Australia the Income Tax
Assessment Act 1997 imposed an immediate CGT
liability on shareholders who disposed of their
shares in response to a takeover offer irrespective
of the type of consideration received. From 10
December 1999, however, target shareholders
have been permitted to elect to defer the payment
of CGT when equity is received as part of a
takeover offer until the subsequent disposal of
those shares. This change in regulatory environ-
ment provides a unique opportunity to test whether
there is a shift in the structure of corporate acqui-
sitions in response to a modification in the taxation
treatment of shareholders. Specifically, this study
examines the relationship between target share-
holder capital gains and the method of payment
choice before and after this change in the regulato-
ry environment. For takeovers announced during
the earlier regime, we expect to find no association
between the choice of payment method and share-
holder capital gains. Subsequent to 10 December
1999, however, we expect to find that the proba-
bility that target shareholders are offered equity as
consideration will increase with the level of target
shareholder capital gains. To test this hypothesis,
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we use two measures to approximate target share-
holder capital gains. Consistent with prior research
in the US (Erickson, 1998; Ayers et al., 2004) the
first proxy measures capital gains as the share
price 20 days prior to the takeover announcement
less the average share price over the prior two
years. The second estimate of capital gains is cal-
culated as the difference between the share price
20 days prior to the takeover announcement and
the share price two years previous. This capital
gain is then either indexed for inflation or a capital
gains discount of 50% allowed under section 115-
100 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.
For the first measure of target shareholder capi-
tal gains our results show that, after the introduc-
tion of CGT rollover, there is a significant
reduction in the probability that cash and mixed
payment forms will be offered as consideration in
takeovers with higher estimated target shareholder
capital gains. The second measure of capital gains,
however, provides insignificant results. When we
re-estimate our results only for target firms where
the estimated holding period is between zero and
three years, we obtain significant results indicating
a shift from cash to equity payment for takeovers
with higher target shareholder capital gains for
both proxies of target shareholder capital gains.
For mixed payment forms, however, the results
still only remain supportive of our hypothesis
using the first capital gains measure. Our findings
significantly contribute to the literature as it is the
first study that documents a significant association
between proxies for the size of target shareholder
capital gains and the choice of payment method.
This study thus provides evidence on the impor-
tance of shareholder level taxation for the acquisi-
tion structure of publicly listed firms. This finding
also adds to the factors that have been shown in
prior studies to explain payment method.
This paper also extends our knowledge as it is
the first to examine comprehensively the method
of payment choice by Australian acquirers. As
such, the study provides evidence on whether sim-
ilar factors determine payment form as previously
documented in Europe and the US. The findings
show that an acquiring firm is more likely to offer
cash or a mixed payment form when it has a high-
er free cash flow or a greater toehold stake in the
target firm. Furthermore, target firms with a high-
er market-to-book ratio are more likely to be of-
fered equity payment, consistent with the presence
of information asymmetry and a greater uncertain-
ty over the expected synergy that will arise from
the takeover. The results also indicate that mixed
payment forms are offered more frequently in
friendly takeovers and to target firms of greater size.
The remainder of this study is organised as fol-
lows. The next section describes the taxation treat-
ment of capital gains in Australia and summarises
prior research relevant to this study. Section 3 de-
velops the model tested in the paper, whilst
Section 4 describes the sample and presents re-
sults. The final section of the paper discusses con-
clusions and possible areas of future research.
2. Regulation and prior literature
2.1. Taxation of capital gains on share disposals
in Australia
The Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 is the main
legislative authority on taxation in Australia with
the treatment of capital gains addressed in Chap-
ter 3 of the Act.2 Under this Act, the disposal of
shares acquired after 19 September 1985 results in
the shareholder generating a taxable capital gain or
loss (section 104-10). Shares acquired prior to this
date are not subject to CGT when sold. Any capi-
tal gain generated on disposal of the shares is tax-
able at the shareholder’s marginal tax rate, whilst
realised capital losses can only be offset against
current or future capital gains (section 102-5). For
shares acquired on or before 21 September 1999,
the capital gain is calculated after indexing the cost
of the shares for inflation with the proviso that the
shares have been owned for more than 12 months
(section 114-1). However, indexation is not avail-
able where the shareholders realise a capital loss
(section 114-5). Furthermore, subsequent to 
21 September 1999, section 114-1 indicates that
indexation is no longer available at all. For invest-
ments purchased prior to 21 September 1999, in-
dexation has been frozen at the indexed cost
measured on 30 September 1999. Replacing the
indexation system, shareholders who dispose of
their investment after 21 September 1999 are per-
mitted to discount the capital gain if at the time of
disposal they held the shares for more than 12
months (section 115-100). The rate of the discount
is 50% for individuals and trusts and 331⁄3% for su-
perannuation funds and life insurance companies
(section 115-100). Shareholders who acquired
their interest prior to 21 September 1999 may
choose to take the CGT discount or use the frozen
indexed cost of the shares when calculating their
taxable capital gain (section 114-5).
Prior to 10 December 1999, target shareholders
in Australian takeovers were required to pay CGT
on shares sold into a takeover irrespective of the
form of consideration received. As a result, target
shareholders who received equity as consideration
were immediately liable to pay CGT. This out-
come is in contrast to the UK and US legal envi-
ronment, which allows shareholders who receive
equity as payment in a takeover to defer the taxa-
tion until the ultimate sale of the shares received.
From 10 December 1999 onwards, target share-
332 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 The Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 is available at:
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/index.htm.
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holders who, as part of an Australian takeover, ex-
change the same type of interest (i.e. shares ex-
changed for shares, or a trust interest for another
trust interest) can elect to roll over any capital gain
until the ultimate disposal of the interest received
as takeover consideration. This election is only
available to shareholders if the acquiring firm at
the completion of the takeover acquires an owner-
ship interest in the target of at least 80% (sections
124-780 and 124-781). Where target firm share-
holders are offered both cash and equity, they can
only partially roll over the capital gain.3
The roll-over of CGT was introduced because
the previous provisions ‘were considered an im-
pediment to corporate acquisition activity in
Australia’4 and followed numerous calls from in-
terest groups for taxation reform. For example, a
representative of the Securities Institute of
Australia, commenting on the taxation of target
shareholders who receive scrip under a takeover
offer stated, ‘not all takeovers add value, but re-
stricting them in this way must be damaging our
economy generally’ (Main, 1999: 23). It was ex-
pected that, subsequent to the reforms, there would
be an increase in the use of scrip as payment in
takeovers (Dinnison, 2000).
2.2. Shareholder taxation and corporate 
acquisition structure
Given the immediate taxation of shareholder cap-
ital gains where cash is accepted as payment, pre-
vious US and European research has investigated if
there is a negative association between the use of
cash consideration and target shareholder capital
gains. Faccio and Masulis (2005) find no associa-
tion between the method of payment choice in
Europe and any target shareholder tax advantage
from stock payments. Similarly, Erickson (1998)
finds the payment form in the US is unrelated to es-
timates of the size of target shareholder capital
gains. Similar results are reported for the US in
Auerbach and Reishus (1988) and Ayers et al.
(2004). This later study also examines the method
of payment choice over five different CGT regimes
in the US. Consistent with shareholder level taxa-
tion being an important determinant of acquisition
structure, they show that the use of equity payment
(i.e. a tax-free acquisition) is greatest in those peri-
ods with the highest CGT rates. This association is
found to increase with the size of target institution-
al ownership, consistent with institutions preferring
tax deferred consideration. Reporting results from
the UK, Franks et al. (1988) find that the proportion
of cash-financed acquisitions decreased only over
the immediate period after the introduction of cap-
ital gains taxation. In a different context, Dhaliwal
et al. (2004) find evidence of a higher acquisition
price in the purchase of US hospitals where the
seller has a greater taxation liability.
3. Factors influencing payment form and
empirical method
As bidding firms in a takeover can offer three types
of consideration (i.e. cash, equity or mixed pay-
ment), we use three variants of a binomial logit
model to examine the association between the tar-
get shareholder capital gains and the payment
method. For the purposes of this study, mixed pay-
ment forms are defined as takeovers where share-
holders are offered cash and equity as payment or a
choice between cash and equity payment. We first
compare cash and equity takeovers with the de-
pendent variable (PAYT), indicating takeovers
where the payment form is exclusively cash (model
1a). In the second variation of the model (model
1b), mixed and equity takeovers are included with
PAYT denoting takeovers with mixed payment
forms. In both these iterations of the model, we ex-
pect to find that, subsequent to the introduction of
CGT rollover relief there will be an increased prob-
ability of equity payment being offered where tar-
get shareholders have higher capital gains. The
final iteration of the model is estimated with cash
and mixed bids with PAYT signifying cash
takeovers (model 1c). As shareholders in mixed
bids are still liable to pay taxation on capital gains
relating to the cash component, it is unclear as to
whether there will be a shift from pure cash offers
to mixed payment forms after the regulatory
change.
The independent variables in the payment choice
model include tax variables and other controls that
have been shown in prior research to influence the
method of payment choice. These variables have
been grouped broadly into the following cate-
gories: taxation-related, target and acquiring firm-
related and takeover offer characteristics.
3.1. Taxation-related variables
Target shareholder capital gains are estimated
over the two-year period prior to the takeover an-
nouncement. Consistent with Erickson (1998) and
Ayers et al. (2004), target shareholder capital gains
(CGN20) are estimated as the share price 20 days
prior to the takeover announcement minus the 
average share price over the prior two years. We
also use an alternative measure of the capital gain
(CGNINDEX) that is calculated for takeovers an-
nounced on or before 21 September 1999 by in-
dexing the assumed acquisition cost for inflation.
For this purpose, we assume all target sharehold-
Vol. 38 No. 4. 2008 333
3 The original cost of the shareholding needs to be appor-
tioned to work out the taxable capital gain that relates to the
cash component of the consideration.
4
‘ Capital gains tax: scrip for scrip roll-over – questions and
answers’ – http://www.ato.gov.au/print.asp?doc=/content/
18438.htm.
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ers purchased their shares two years prior to 
the announcement date.5 For the period after 
21 September 1999, the estimated capital gain is
discounted by 50%. These two measures of target
shareholder capital gains will capture any general
association between the payment method choice
and the size of target shareholder gains.
An interaction variable is employed in the model
to determine any impact of the change in taxation
arrangements on the form of consideration offered
(CGN20*CHANGE and CGNINDEX*CHANGE).
This variable interacts respectively each measure
of capital gains with a dummy variable (CHANGE)
that denotes takeovers announced on or after 
10 December 1999. It is hypothesised that this in-
teraction variable will have a significant negative
coefficient in models (1a) and (1b). To highlight if
the change in capital gains taxation resulted in a
shift in payment form that is unrelated to the size
of target shareholder capital gains, CHANGE is
also included in the models.
In Australia, corporations that make a loss for
tax purposes do not receive a refund but are enti-
tled to carry forward the loss to offset against tax-
able income in future years. The deduction of prior
year losses is subject to passing either a ‘same
business test’ or a ‘continuity of ownership’ test
(sections 165-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act
1997). The ‘continuity of ownership’ test requires
that shares carrying more than 50% of voting, div-
idend and capital rights be owned by the same
shareholders from the start of the financial year
that the tax loss was incurred to the end of the fi-
nancial year that the loss is to be offset against tax-
able income. The ‘same business test’ requires that
the entity is carrying on the same business in the
claim year as it was at the start of the loss year. As
shown in Erickson (1998), where the acquirer has
a carry forward tax loss, the firm is less likely to
value further interest deductions and, as such, it is
less likely to offer cash as payment. Ayers et al.
(2004), however, find that losses do not explain
payment choice. Carry forward tax losses are col-
lected from the acquiring firm’s financial state-
ments for the year-end prior to the takeover
announcement. Similar to Ayers et al. (2004), NOL
is defined as the carry forward tax loss multiplied
by the applicable corporate tax rate, divided by the
acquiring firm’s market value of equity at the fi-
nancial year-end before the takeover announce-
ment. This variable is hypothesised to have a
negative coefficient.
As institutional investors generally have lower
tax rates than other shareholders, the amount of
CGT payable will be less than for individual
shareholders.6 Accordingly, the demand for tax-
deferred consideration is expected to decrease at
higher levels of target institutional ownership.
Ayers et al. (2004), however, find that the use of
equity payment is positively associated with the
ownership of institutions in the target firm.
Institutional ownership in the target firm is esti-
mated from the Top 20 shareholder list released at
the financial year-end prior to the takeover 
announcement (TGTINST).7 The model also 
includes an interaction variable between TGTINST
and the change in CGT treatment
(TGTINST*CHANGE). This interaction variable
measures whether the relationship between target
institutional ownership and the payment method
changes in the period after 10 December 1999. For
example, if institutional owners are able to pres-
sure bidding firms to offer tax-deferred considera-
tion, it is expected that target firms with greater
institutional ownership will be more likely to be
offered equity payment after the change in taxation
arrangements.
3.2. Target and acquiring firm characteristics
The financial condition of the bidder will influ-
ence payment choice. Acquisitions financed
through cash typically require firms to obtain ad-
ditional debt finance. The ability of the acquiring
firm to support further debt will depend on the bid-
der’s current leverage and cash-flow, as well as the
financial condition of the target. Where the bidder
can gain access to target free cash flow or target
unused debt capacity, it has a greater ability to fi-
nance the acquisition with cash. As predicted,
Faccio and Masulis (2005) find that greater lever-
age increases the use of equity payment for
European bidders. Mayer and Walker (1996) and
Martin (1996), however, find leverage does not ex-
plain payment method choice in the US.8 In fact,
Mayer and Walker (1996) and Martin (1996) doc-
ument that, in the US, the use of cash is positively
related to proxies for bidder firm free cash flow.
Free cash flow for the acquiring (BIDFCF) and
target firm (TGTFCF) is measured as cash flow
from operations less dividends paid, scaled by
total assets as reported for the financial year prior
to the takeover announcement. Leverage is meas-
ured using the debt-to-equity ratio for the target
(TGTDE) and bidding firms (BIDDE) calculated at
334 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
5 Consumer price index inflation data is available at the
Australian Bureau of Statistics website: http://www.abs.gov.au/.
6 The current maximum income tax rates in Australia are
47% for individuals, 30% for companies and trusts and 15%
for complying superannuation funds. Sourced from the
Australian Taxation Office at: http://www.ato.gov.au/busi-
nesses/pathway.asp?pc=001/003/019&mfp=001/003&mnu=6
01#001_003_019.
7 Similar to Henry (2005), we define institutional share-
holders as: life and non-life insurance companies, fund man-
agement companies, banks, superannuation funds and
investment companies. Nominee shareholdings are not includ-
ed unless it is indicated that they are institutional accounts.
8 Chaney et al. (1991) and Erickson (1998) find US acquir-
ers with higher leverage use cash, consistent with an attempt
to maintain their existing capital structure.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:38
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
the end of the financial year before the takeover
announcement. It is expected that the probability
of cash being offered will be positively related to
the target and the acquiring firm’s free cash flow,
whilst negatively associated to the target and the
bidding firm’s leverage.
The cost of debt financing will influence the
ability and attractiveness of making an acquisition
using cash. It is expected that in periods of relative
high interest rates, bidding firms will prefer to fi-
nance an acquisition using equity. The cost of cor-
porate borrowing is proxied using the indicator
lending rate for the month of the takeover an-
nouncement (IRATE) sourced from the Reserve
Bank of Australia Indicator Lending Rates.9
Bidders with higher levels of insider ownership
have been found in the US to make greater use of
cash financing to avoid diluting the ownership
rights of existing shareholders (Amihud et al.,
1990; Mayer and Walker, 1996; Yook et al., 1999).
Faccio and Masulis (2005) find that insider owner-
ship in Europe is only related to the use of cash
payment at medium levels of insider ownership.
The potential for dilution of ownership to explain
payment form is measured using the percentage
holding of executive and non-executive directors
on the board at the time of the takeover announce-
ment (BIDDIROWN). This variable is predicted to
have a positive coefficient.
Consistent with the arguments of Myers and
Majluf (1983), prior research has found that bid-
ders offer equity where the firm’s stock is overval-
ued (e.g. Faccio and Masulis, 2005 in Europe; Da
Silva Rosa et al., 2000 in Australia; Mayer and
Walker, 1996; Martin, 1996; Erickson, 1998;
Emery and Switzer, 1999; and Ayers et al., 2004 
in the US). Overvaluation is measured using the
acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio (BIDMB)
calculated at the financial year-end prior to the
takeover announcement. We expect this variable to
have a negative coefficient in the regression
model. Faccio and Masulis (2005) provide an al-
ternative explanation for a negative association be-
tween an acquiring firm’s market-to-book ratio
and cash payment. They argue that this finding is
consistent with acquiring firms with greater
growth prospects having greater stock attractive-
ness as merger consideration.
The models of Hansen (1987) and Fishman
(1989) argue that, where there is greater informa-
tion asymmetry regarding the value of the target,
equity is more likely to be offered as payment.
Similarly, an acquirer is more likely to offer equi-
ty where they are uncertain as to the potential syn-
ergy that may arise from a takeover. Information
asymmetry has been proxied in previous research
using the absolute size of the target, as well as the
relative size of the target to the bidder. In Australia
and Europe, as predicted, Da Silva Rosa et al.
(2000) and Faccio and Masulis (2005) respective-
ly find that a larger relative size is associated with
more frequent use of equity payment. In contrast,
the relative size of the target to the bidder has gen-
erally been found to be insignificant in explaining
payment choice in the US (see Martin, 1996;
Mayer and Walker 1996; and Emery and Switzer
1999). We proxy for information asymmetry and
uncertainty over the value of the target by includ-
ing the following variables in the payment choice
model: target firm size (TGTSIZE), target market-
to-book ratio (TGTMB) and the relative size of the
target to the bidder (RELSIZE). Each variable is
measured at the financial year-end prior to the
takeover announcement. Size is measured using
the natural logarithm of the target firm’s market
capitalisation. All three variables are expected to
have a negative coefficient in the payment choice
model.
When the bidder has a greater initial toehold
stake in the target, the consideration required to fi-
nance the acquisition from current cash reserves
decreases. It is expected, therefore, that the toe-
hold stake will be positively related to the likeli-
hood of a cash bid. The toehold interest
(TOEHOLD) of the acquiring firm in the target at
the time of the takeover announcement is added to
the payment choice model.
3.3. Takeover offer characteristics
Fishman (1989) and Mayer and Walker (1996)
argue that cash is used as payment to obtain a com-
petitive advantage in the bidding process. Where
the takeover is hostile and/or there is an expecta-
tion that competing bidders may enter into a bid-
ding contest, it is important that the takeover be
completed quickly. Consistent with this expecta-
tion, Mayer and Walker (1996) and Ayers et al.
(2004) find that cash is used more frequently in US
hostile takeovers,10 whilst Erickson (1998) reports
that a cash offer is more probable in the US where
there are multiple acquirers. Faccio and Masulis
(2005), however, find that takeover hostility does
not explain payment choice in Europe. Target firm
hostility and the presence of multiple bidders are
controlled using binary variables. DIRREC is a
variable denoting takeovers where the initial rec-
ommendation of the target board is to recommend
acceptance, whilst MULTIPLE indicates takeovers
where competing bidders exist for the target firm.
Both variables are predicted to have positive coef-
ficients.
The complete logit regression model of method
of payment choice is as follows:
Vol. 38 No. 4. 2008 335
9 Available at: http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/
10 The use of cash accelerates the process as acquiring firm
shareholders in the US need to approve the issue of stock in
equity bids.
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The model of payment method choice is esti-
mated separately for cash versus equity takeovers
(1a), mixed versus equity takeovers (1b) and cash
versus mixed takeovers (1c) using in turn each of
the two estimates of target shareholder capital gains
(i.e. CGN is, in turn, CGN20 and CGNINDEX).
Table 1 provides a summary of the variable defini-
tions and measurement in addition to indicating
the predicted signs of the coefficients.
4. Data and results
The Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions Database
was used to identify 435 takeovers announced on
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) during the
period 1996–2003. As capital gains roll-over is
only available where the bidder firm acquires at
least 80% ownership in the target (sections 124-
780 and 124-781 of the Income Tax Assessment
Act 1997), we restricted the search criteria to
takeovers for 100% of the target shares when 
initially selecting takeovers to be analysed.
Additionally, we excluded takeovers where the
consideration offered an exchange of non-equiva-
lent interests (e.g. shares for a trust interest). This
period encompasses approximately four years pre-
and post-introduction of roll-over relief for equity
exchange takeovers. Over this timeframe, there
was no adjustment to the highest individual mar-
ginal tax rate (i.e. 47%). The data required to esti-
mate the regression model (1) was obtained from a
number of sources and is summarised in Table 1.
Annual reports for bidder and target firms in the
year preceding the takeover were used to hand col-
lect accounting information and institutional own-
ership. Huntley’s Aspect FinAnalysis database was
used as the source of annual reports. Takeover doc-
uments lodged with the ASX were used to collect
information on: method of payment, the ownership
interest of acquiring firm directors, the recommen-
dation of the target firm board, the toehold interest
of the acquiring firm and the presence of compet-
ing bidders. Takeover documents were sourced
from the Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions
Database and the Securities Industry Research
Centre of Asia-Pacific (i.e. SIRCA) TIFF Images
of ASX announcements. Share price data and the
average daily trading volume of target firms were
collected from the Core Research Database main-
tained by SIRCA.
To ensure a complete data set was available to
estimate the regression model, we excluded those
takeovers with missing observations for one or
more of the variables. Details of the reasons for the
exclusion of takeovers are summarised in Table 2.
The main reason for deleting observations lies in
the bidding firm’s lack of public listing in
Australia. After removing takeovers with missing
information, we were left with 194 takeovers,
which are then used to estimate the payment
choice model. This group of takeovers includes
both completed and unsuccessful takeover bids,
with approximately 65% of takeovers successful.
Table 3 shows the distribution of payment
method across the observation period. As hypoth-
esised, there is a reduction in the use of cash 
payment after the legislative change from 51% to
49% of takeovers and an increase in pure equity
payment from 31% to 33% of takeovers. However,
z-statistics indicate that this change is insignifi-
cant. It is also notable that, contrary to expecta-
tions, the percentage of acquiring firms using cash
increases from 36% in 1999 to 49% in 2000.
Descriptive statistics across payment method for
the non-tax variables included in model (1) are
provided in Table 4. As expected, bidding firms
are more likely to offer equity when the target and
acquirer have lower free cash flow. The toehold in-
terest in cash and mixed takeovers are significant-
ly higher than for equity bidders, indicating that
bidders are more likely to offer cash (either in
whole or part) when the total amount of consider-
ation to be paid is lower. Target firm size is signif-
icantly related to payment method with larger
firms more likely to be offered mixed considera-
tion followed by cash payment. Inconsistent with
the result in Erickson (1998), we find no associa-
tion between payment method and competing bid-
ders for the target. Target firm leverage does not
influence the payment method offered, despite
cash bidders having a significantly higher level of
indebtedness than equity bidders. Where the target
firm board recommends takeover acceptance, the
bidding firm is more likely to offer mixed consid-
eration. The results for ownership of acquiring
firm directors are inconsistent with expectations as
acquiring firms offer equity when directors own a
higher percentage of the firm.
In the final row of Table 4, Panel A, we present
statistics on the average holding period of target
firm shares calculated by dividing the number of
issued shares at the time of the takeover an-
nouncement by the average daily trading volume
over the prior two years (HOLDPER). The average
holding period does not differ across payment type
and ranges between two and three years. This find-
ing indicates that estimating target shareholder
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PAYTi = αi + β1CGNi + β2CGN*CHANGEi + β3CHANGEi + β4NOLi + β5TGTINSTi (1)
+ β6TGTINST*CHANGEi + β7TGTDEi + β8BIDDEi + β9TGTFCFi + β10BIDFCFi
+ β11BIDDIROWNi + β12BIDMBi + β13TGTMBi + β14TGTSIZEi + β15RELSIZEi
+ β16TOEHOLDi + β17IRATEi + β18DIRRECi + β19MULTIPLEi + εit
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Table 3
Payment method use and pre- and post-taxation change
This table presents method of payment use pre- and post-change to CGT on 10 December 1999. Cash and 
equity bids are entirely cash or equity financed. Mixed payment offers provide target shareholders with either
a choice of cash or equity or a combination of cash and equity. For each row, the percentage of each payment
method is presented in italics.
Cash Equity Mixed Total
Panel A:
Pre-tax change
1996 12 6 4 22
55 27 18 100
1997 9 6 1 16
56 38 6 100
1998 18 9 5 32
56 28 16 100
1999 9 8 8 25
36 32 32 100
Total 48 29 18 95
51 31 18 100
Panel B:
Post-tax change
2000 19 12 8 39
49 31 20 100
2001 12 9 3 24
50 38 12 100
2002 8 8 1 17
47 47 6 100
2003 10 4 5 19
53 32 26 100
Total 49 33 17 99
49 33 18 100
Table 2
Sample selection
Takeovers announced for ASX listed companies between 1996 and 2003 are included in the sample. The table
identifies the reasons for the exclusion of takeovers from the final sample.
Takeovers for ASX listed targets announced between 1996 and 2003 435
Exclusions:
Bidders not listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 198
Target firm does not disclose required information 8
Offer withdrawn prior to release of target firm statutory documents 21
Target firm has no financial information as it is listed in year of takeover 3
Bidder does not disclose required information 11
Takeovers included in model of payment method choice 194
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capital gains in model (1) over the two years prior
to a takeover announcement provides a reasonable
approximation of the holding period for the aver-
age shareholder.
Table 5 provides summary statistics across pay-
ment types for the taxation variables incorporated
in model (1). Statistics are presented separately for
the period before (Panel A) and after the change to
CGT (Panel B). Panel C of the table presents a sta-
tistical comparison of the variables pre- and post-
taxation change. Prior to the introduction of roll-
over relief, the results for the non-indexed measure
of capital gains indicate that target shareholder
capital gains are significantly lower in equity bids
than in both cash and mixed bids. Given that
shareholders were subject to CGT during this peri-
od irrespective of the form of consideration re-
ceived, this finding indicates that cash or a mixed
payment form was being offered to shareholders
with higher capital gains for other reasons. One
potential explanation is that providing sharehold-
ers with at least some amount of cash gives the
shareholders a liquid asset with which to pay their
taxation liability. In comparison, offering share-
holders equity potentially requires the shareholder
to sell the shares received to meet their taxation
obligations and hence incur transaction costs.
Subsequent to the introduction of capital gains
roll-over relief, the results for both capital gains
measures show that estimated capital gains are
higher in cash offers than equity bids. These pre-
liminary findings do not support the expectation
that, after the change in regulation, equity would
be offered more frequently to shareholders with
greater unrealised capital gains. The results also
demonstrate no difference in acquiring firm carry
forward tax losses across payment types either be-
fore or after the change in taxation.
The findings presented in Panel A of Table 5
show that, before December 1999, institutional
ownership in the target is significantly lower in eq-
uity bids than both other payment types. However,
subsequent to the tax change, target institutional
ownership in equity bids is no longer significantly
different from the other payment forms.
Additionally, target institutional ownership in cash
takeovers is significantly lower post-change in
regulation (see Panel C). These findings suggest
that with post-regulation change, there is a move
away from cash being used as payment where there
is greater institutional ownership in the target firm.
This shift in acquisition structure will allow insti-
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics across payment methods
This table presents means of the non-tax variables included in the logit regression model of payment choice.
These variables are expected to influence the method of payment choice of acquiring firms. A univariate test
of differences in means across the payment methods is also presented. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 1.
Cash Mixed Equity Cash v Cash v Mixed
(n = 97) (n = 35) (n = 62) Equity Mixed v Equity
Panel A: Mean for continuous variables t-test t-test t-test
TGTDE 1.17 1.13 3.82 –0.85 0.15 –0.86
BIDDE 1.19 1.16 0.87 2.19** 0.19 1.33
TGTFCF 3.00 1.76 –4.80 3.01*** 0.48 2.19**
BIDFCF 6.11 4.61 –5.16 3.01*** 0.50 2.63***
BIDDIROWN 12.31 10.04 18.06 –1.88* 0.65 –2.17**
BIDMB 2.05 1.69 2.31 –0.67 1.33 –1.47
TGTMB 1.82 1.30 1.84 –0.05 1.57 –1.12
TGTSIZE 17.67 18.70 17.06 2.26** –3.38*** 5.02***
RELSIZE 0.34 0.58 1.01 –1.55 –2.10** –0.98
IRATE 8.80 8.74 8.73 0.65 0.41 0.09
TOEHOLD 20.39 17.46 10.40 3.46*** 0.81 1.93*
HOLDPER 671 741 682 –1.02 –1.21 0.97
Panel B: Proportion of binary variables coded as 1 z-test z-test z-test
DIRREC 46.39 65.71 46.77 –0.05 –1.96** 1.80*
MULTIPLE 28.87 25.71 17.74 1.59 0.36 0.93
*** indicates significance at the .10 level
*** indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significance at the .01 level
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tutional investors to roll over (at least in part) their
CGT liability to the subsequent disposal of the
shares received in the takeover.
A correlation matrix of the independent vari-
ables included in the payment choice model is pro-
vided in Table 6. As would be expected, there is a
high degree of correlation between the two meas-
ures of target shareholder capital gains. For the re-
maining independent variables, there is significant
correlation between a number of the variables. The
size of the correlation, however, suggests that
multi-collinearity is unlikely to be a problem in the
estimation of model (1) (Gujarati, 1995: 335–336).
The results for target firm size indicate that larger
target firms have greater institutional ownership,
higher free cash flow and attract a takeover from
bidders with larger free cash flow. Acquiring firm
director ownership is negatively associated with
acquiring firm free cash flow, thereby suggesting
an agency problem in acquiring firms (Jensen,
1986). As would be expected, a target firm is less
likely to receive competing takeovers when the
takeover is friendly and the bidding firm has a
higher toehold.
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of esti-
mating the three variations of model (1) for the
complete set of observations. The model is esti-
mated in turn using each of the two measures of
target shareholder capital gains. Relative to pure
equity takeovers, target shareholder capital gains
are found to be significantly higher in both cash
bids and mixed bids. This finding is robust to the
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Table 5
Comparison of tax variables before and after the change to CGT
The table presents descriptive statistics on the tax-related variables included in model (1). Panel A shows sta-
tistics pre-change in taxation, whilst Panel B shows statistics post-change in taxation. Both panels also present
a t-test for differences across payment methods within each time period. Panel C provides a statistical test of
differences within the same payment method pre- and post-regulatory change in taxation. CGN20 is an esti-
mate of target shareholder capital gains calculated as the share price 20 days before the takeover announcement
less the average price over the prior two years, divided by the average share price over the prior two years.
CGNINDEX is an estimate of target shareholder capital gains calculated as the share price 20 days before the
takeover announcement minus the share price two years prior. For takeovers before the introduction of the CGT
roll-over, the capital gain is calculated after indexing the assumed purchase price. For subsequent takeovers,
the capital gain is multiplied by the capital gains discount of 50%. The calculated capital gain is divided by the
share price two years prior to the takeover announcement. TGTINST is the institutional ownership in the target
firm at the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement estimated from the Top 20 shareholders’ list.
NOL is the carry forward tax losses of the acquiring firm at the financial year-end prior to the takeover an-
nouncement multiplied by the corporate tax rate and divided by market capitalisation at the financial year-end
prior to the takeover announcement.
Cash Mixed Equity Cash v Cash v Mixed
(n = 97) (n = 35) (n = 62) Equity Mixed v Equity
Panel A: Prior to tax change t-test t-test t-test
CGN20 –2.47 –3.62 –25.51 2.60** 0.14 2.13**
CGNINDEX 12.50 –9.13 –15.21 1.07 1.42 0.24
TGTINST 15.73 16.95 7.58 2.64** –0.38 2.95***
NOL 1.76 1.00 5.59 –1.51 0.95 –1.42
Panel B: After the tax change t-test t-test t-test
CGN20 3.30 5.52 –12.72 1.92* –0.19 1.48
CGNINDEX –0.65 6.43 –22.13 2.27** –0.34 1.36
TGTINST 6.27 12.34 9.53 –1.14 –2.16** 0.78
NOL 2.89 1.01 3.88 –0.39 1.27 –1.25
Panel C: Pre- vs post-t-test
CGN20 –0.84 –0.73 –1.27
CGNINDEX 1.00 –0.71 0.29
TGTINST 3.79*** 1.35 –0.57
NOL –0.80 –0.01 0.52
*** indicates significance at the .01 level
*** indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significance at the .10 level
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measure used to approximate target shareholder
capital gains. There is no statistical difference,
however, between target shareholder capital gains
in cash and mixed bids. These results are consis-
tent with a liquidity explanation: target sharehold-
ers with a greater taxation liability require at least
some cash to meet this obligation.
The negative coefficient on the interaction vari-
ables between target capital gains and the change
in the taxation environment indicate a shift to eq-
uity from both cash and mixed bids. These results
are, however, significant only for the unindexed
capital gains interaction variable. This finding pro-
vides some evidence that shareholder level taxa-
tion is an important determinant of the corporate
acquisition structure.
Inconsistent with expectations and prior studies
(Erickson, 1998, and Ayers et al., 2004), we find
that acquiring firms with greater carry forward
losses are more likely to offer cash than both equi-
ty and mixed payment. This result is puzzling as it
would be expected that firms with carry forward
losses would not value the additional deductions
associated with the interest payments arising from
the debt financing of the takeover. The results
show no association between target institutional
ownership and the method of payment suggesting
that institutional owners do not favour any one
payment type. However, confirming the univariate
results, the interaction between target institutional
ownership and the change in taxation arrange-
ments is significantly negative for model (1a).
This finding indicates that acquiring firms were
more likely to offer equity than cash after the
change in taxation arrangements to target firms
with greater institutional ownership. This suggests
that bidding firms changed payment structure to
allow institutions to roll over capital gains. A sim-
ilar finding is reported in Ayers et al. (2004). They
document a positive association between tax-free
acquisitions and target institutional ownership in
the US.
For the non-tax variables, the financial condition
of the acquiring firm influences the payment
method, with cash and mixed payment being used
more frequently than equity where bidder free cash
flow is higher. This result is similar to that report-
ed in Mayer and Walker (1996) and Martin (1996).
In contrast to the results in Faccio and Masulis
(2005), leverage is unrelated to the method of pay-
ment with both acquiring and target firm debt-to-
equity ratios having insignificant coefficients. This
result suggests that the level of debt of both the tar-
get and acquiring firms at the time of the takeovers
is insufficiently high to influence the method of
payment choice. 
Consistent with the univariate results, mixed
payment is more likely to be offered in friendly
takeovers and takeovers of larger target firms.
Furthermore, a higher relative size of the target
firm is significantly associated with a greater use
of mixed payment than cash payment. These find-
ings suggest that the target board in these
takeovers has greater bargaining power allowing
them to obtain a choice of payment for their share-
holders. As predicted, a higher acquiring firm toe-
hold significantly decreases the probability of an
equity bid. The target firm market-to-book ratio is
positively related to the probability of an equity
bid, consistent with an information asymmetry ex-
planation. This result is also consistent with
greater uncertainty as to potential synergy where
the value of a target firm is driven more by growth
options than assets-in-place. Competing bidders
and the ownership of the acquiring firm board are
not associated with payment method. The insignif-
icant coefficient on the acquiring firm market-to-
book ratio does not support the argument that
overvalued firms will be more likely to offer equi-
ty. A potential explanation for this finding is that
this variable does not adequately measure acquir-
ing firm overvaluation. Although the coefficient
on the prevailing interest rate is negative, it is in-
significant in all variants of model (1). A possible
explanation for this finding is that, over the period
of the study, the corporate interest rate moved in a
narrow range between 8% and 10.5%.
A limitation with the estimation of model (1) is
that the calculation of capital gains assumes target
shareholders have owned their shares for two
years. To assess the impact of this assumption,
model (1) is re-estimated using only those targets
where the calculated holding period is less than
three years. This holding period comprises ap-
proximately 75% of the sample. These results are
presented in Panel B of Table 7. For model (1a),
the results on the interaction variable between tar-
get capital gains and the change in the taxation en-
vironment are now significantly negative using
both the indexed and non-indexed capital gains
measures. This finding indicates that, subsequent
to the regulatory change, acquiring firms were
more likely to offer equity than cash to target
shareholders with higher capital gains. This result
provides additional support for the importance of
target shareholder CGT on corporate acquisition
structure. The results for model 1(b) remain signif-
icant only for the unindexed capital gains interac-
tion variable.
The conclusions on the remaining variables
largely remain unchanged from those presented in
Panel A for the full set of acquiring firms. Target
institutional ownership is now, however, positive
and significant in model (1a) indicating that cash is
more likely to be offered in takeovers with higher
institutional ownership. This result is consistent
with institutions having a lower marginal tax rate
than individual shareholders. Additionally, the size
Vol. 38 No. 4. 2008 345
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Table 7
Results of estimating logit regression model of the method of payment choice
Model (1) examines the impact of the change in CGT arrangements on the payment method used in takeovers.
The dependent variable is a binary variable denoting takeovers where the payment method is: exclusively cash
(models 1a and 1c) and a mixed payment form (model 1b). CGN20 is an estimate of target shareholder capital
gains calculated as the share price 20 days before the takeover announcement less the average price over the
prior two years, divided by the average share price over the prior two years. CGNINDEX is an estimate of tar-
get shareholder capital gains calculated as the share price 20 days before the takeover announcement minus the
share price two years prior. For takeovers before the introduction of the CGT roll-over, the capital gain is cal-
culated after indexing the assumed purchase price. For subsequent takeovers, the capital gain is multiplied by
the capital gains discount of 50%. The calculated capital gain is divided by the share price two years prior to
the takeover announcement. The model also includes other variables expected to be associated with the pay-
ment method choice of acquiring firms. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 1 (t-statistics are
shown in parentheses).
Panel A: Full sample
Cash vs Cash vs Mixed vs Mixed vs Cash vs Cash vs
Equity Equity Equity Equity Mixed Mixed
(1a) (1a) (1b) (1b) (1c) (1c)
Intercept 0.7746 –0.1700 –15.4660 –16.9010 10.3500 10.5920
(0.21) (–0.05) (–2.29)** (–2.51)** (2.36)** (2.44)**
CGN20 2.4991 – 5.9298 – –0.8071 –
(2.63)*** (2.50)** (–0.65)
CGN20*CHANGE –2.0078 – –5.0307 – 0.1593 –
(–2.15)** (–1.97)** (0.10)
CGNINDEX – 0.7294 – 2.1296 – 0.3985
(2.19)** (2.53)** (0.62)
CGNINDEX*CHANGE – –0.1919 – –1.5077 – –0.7943
(–0.26) (–1.51) (–0.88)
CHANGE –0.1422 0.3471 –1.3658 –0.9819 1.1865 1.3056
(–0.24) (0.61) (–1.09) (–0.88) (1.51) (1.63)
NOL 5.7428 6.4874 16.3960 14.4540 19.4310 20.5060
(1.74)* (1.72)* (1.44) (1.36) (1.90)* (1.97)**
TGTINST 3.5737 6.7614 7.9307 6.7647 2.5311 3.5045
(1.36) (1.62) (1.56) (1.47) (0.87) (1.11)
TGTINST*CHANGE –6.0990 –6.7614 –6.2720 –5.5174 –4.6593 –5.7079
(–1.66)* (–1.84)* (–1.12) (–1.03) (–1.00) (–1.19)
TGTDE 0.1400 0.1715 0.1892 0.0790 –0.0626 –0.0227
(1.28) (1.41) (0.51) (0.23) (–0.23) (–0.08)
BIDDE 0.3333 0.2825 –0.2361 –0.2371 –0.0764 –0.0570
(1.39) (1.19) (–0.51) (–0.57) (–0.23) (–0.17)
TGTFCF 0.8024 1.4100 –5.0326 –4.9363 2.9429 2.4694
(0.51) (0.89) (–1.55) (–1.51) (1.25) (1.08)
BIDFCF 2.1961 2.0617 5.9845 7.2219 –0.2031 –0.3201
(2.00)** (1.89)* (1.79)* (1.97)** (–0.11) (–0.18)
BIDDIROWN –0.8999 –0.7265 –0.2375 –0.1126 –0.0626 –0.0022
(–0.77) (–0.63) (–0.10) (–0.05) (–0.04) (–0.01)
BIDMB –0.1117 –0.1018 –0.0728 –0.0574 0.3173 0.3083
(–1.14) (–1.03) (–0.46) (–0.38) (1.58) (1.51)
TGTMB –0.1531 –0.1805 –0.5582 –0.7535 0.3230 0.2461
(–1.67)* (–1.68)* (–2.04)** (–2.39)** (1.14) (0.76)
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Table 7
Results of estimating logit regression model of the method of payment choice (continued)
Panel A: Full sample (continued)
Cash vs Cash vs Mixed vs Mixed vs Cash vs Cash vs
Equity Equity Equity Equity Mixed Mixed
(1a) (1a) (1b) (1b) (1c) (1c)
TGTSIZE 0.1348 0.1077 1.1622 1.1453 –0.5774 –0.5426
(0.87) (0.68) (3.54)*** (3.64)*** (–3.07)*** (–2.92)***
RELSIZE –0.3603 –0.3702 –0.8813 –0.7673 –0.8009 –0.8065
(–1.27) (–1.30) (–1.11) (–1.08) (–1.78)* (–1.81)*
TOEHOLD 3.0519 3.2179 6.0179 5.4593 1.4244 1.7317
(2.17)** (2.33)** (2.41)** (2.35)** (1.03) (1.25)
IRATE –3.5660 –2.4765 –4.7179 –5.2280 –1.9122 –1.2617
(–1.19) (–0.87) (–1.37) (–1.05) (–0.06) (–0.41)
DIRREC 0.2715 0.2715 1.8946 1.9690 –0.9015 –0.9779
(0.61) (0.62) (2.28)** (2.46)** (–1.66)* (–1.77)*
MULTIPLE 0.7649 0.8840 0.5038 0.5576 0.0352 –0.0202
(1.45) (1.32) (0.61) (0.68) (0.06) (–0.03)
N 159 159 97 97 132 132
Log-likelihood ratio 52.15*** 49.71*** 60.05*** 56.86*** 33.28** 33.45**
McFadden R2 0.2452 0.2338 0.4734 0.4482 0.2180 0.2191
% Classified correctly 77.99 76.99 88.66 87.63 80.30 81.06
*** indicates significance at the .01 level
*** indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significance at the .10 level
Panel B: Target firms with holding periods between 0–3 years
Cash vs Cash vs Mixed vs Mixed vs Cash vs Cash vs
Equity Equity Equity Equity Mixed Mixed
(1a) (1a) (1b) (1b) (1c) (1c)
Intercept –2.8950 –4.6272 –18.5910 –20.2430 8.1341 8.6020
(–0.21) (–0.89) (–1.18) (–1.34) (1.50) (1.55)
CGN20 2.0657 – 7.0907 – –0.7169 –
(2.18)** (2.06)** (–0.43)
CGN20*CHANGE –1.8937 – –3.3686 – 0.2242 –
(–1.96)** (–2.13)** (0.11)
CGNINDEX – 0.9095 – 2.2161 – 0.2836
(2.14)** (1.82)* (0.32)
CGNINDEX*CHANGE – –1.4937 – 1.3476 – –0.6778
(–1.97)** (0.29) (–0.64)
CHANGE 0.6404 0.6827 4.4935 3.6351 0.4628 0.6283
(0.92) (0.96) (1.00) (0.97) (0.46) (0.59)
NOL 3.2030 6.3784 75.5990 56.8080 12.0510 12.4230
(1.71)* (1.70)* (1.95)* (1.69)* (1.98)** (1.68)*
TGTINST 5.9386 5.8576 31.2080 23.3890 5.0802 6.6833
(1.79)* (1.76)* (1.54) (1.45) (1.00) (1.16)
TGTINST*CHANGE –7.6933 –9.0920 –16.7290 –10.6180 –7.2211 –8.8829
(–1.69)* (–1.86)* (–1.00) (–0.65) (–1.17) (–1.32)
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Table 7
Results of estimating logit regression model of the method of payment choice (continued)
Panel B: Target firms with holding periods between 0–3 years (continued)
Cash vs Cash vs Mixed vs Mixed vs Cash vs Cash vs
Equity Equity Equity Equity Mixed Mixed
(1a) (1a) (1b) (1b) (1c) (1c)
TGTDE 0.0505 0.2846 1.3584 1.1728 –0.5197 –0.4830
(0.41) (1.65) (1.62) (1.57) (–1.49) (–1.36)
BIDDE 0.2829 0.3024 –2.6984 –2.4443 0.2393 0.2603
(1.04) (1.11) (–2.28)** (–2.06)** (0.59) (0.64)
TGTFCF 0.8015 0.6129 5.2195 5.2167 1.3940 1.0526
(0.46) (0.33) (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.47)
BIDFCF 1.8816 1.7406 12.9900 14.5100 0.4275 0.3250
(1.67)* (1.75)* (1.75)* (1.68)* (0.17) (0.14)
BIDDIROWN –0.6727 –1.0306 4.8136 6.0542 0.5679 0.6717
(–0.46) (–0.70) (0.92) (1.04) (0.30) (0.36)
BIDMB –0.2052 –0.2876 –0.1887 –0.2102 0.2237 0.2217
(–1.63) (–2.30)** (–0.83) (–0.84) (0.96) (0.95)
TGTMB –0.0696 –0.2850 –1.4150 –1.4632 0.2864 0.2840
(–1.75)* (–1.93)* (–2.12)** (–2.43)** (1.26) (1.05)
TGTSIZE 0.1166 0.2543 2.3292 2.3143 –0.5724 –0.5558
(0.58) (1.18) (2.27)** (2.05)** (–2.73)*** (–2.59)**
RELSIZE –0.2386 –0.3368 –3.4104 –3.1786 –0.7073 –0.7102
(–0.86) (–1.78)* (–1.33) (–1.22) (–1.89)* (–1.69)*
TOEHOLD 7.1373 7.1711 8.1370 36.0010 –2.0972 –1.9202
(2.55)** (2.60)*** (2.19)** (1.98)** (–1.04) (–0.95)
IRATE 1.0421 –4.3759 –3.6974 –3.4115 3.1898 2.0013
(0.03) (–0.11) (–1.46) (–1.04) (0.63) (0.38)
DIRREC 0.4821 0.6649 4.5187 4.6254 –0.7595 –0.7400
(0.87) (1.15) (2.15)** (1.91)* (–1.74)* (–1.68)*
MULTIPLE 0.6222 0.6428 –1.3295 –0.5189 0.4223 0.4129
(1.03) (1.05) (–0.75) (–0.27) (0.53) (0.53)
N 120 120 71 71 101 101
Log-likelihood ratio 42.70*** 46.22*** 66.23*** 56.86*** 30.09* 30.19*
McFadden R2 0.2827 0.3059 0.6295 0.5969 0.2763 0.2773
% Classified correctly 77.88 77.45 85.65 84.20 80.85 79.79
*** indicates significance at the .01 level
*** indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significance at the .10 level
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of carry forward tax losses is now positive and sig-
nificant in the three variations of model (1). This
finding is inconsistent with predictions. The bid-
ding firm market-to-book ratio is negative and sig-
nificant in model (1a) using the indexed capital
gain. This result provides limited support that
overvalued acquiring firms offer equity considera-
tion. Higher acquiring firm leverage is found to in-
crease significantly the probability of an equity bid
relative to a mixed bid. Although this is consistent
with higher levered firms avoiding debt, the in-
significant finding for this variable in model (1a)
suggests this result must be viewed with caution.
The significant negative coefficient on the relative
size of the target in model (1a) when the indexed
capital gain is used provides additional support
that information asymmetry leads to the use of eq-
uity payment.
4.1. Additional analysis
Target firm institutional ownership and capital
gains
The results in Table 7 indicate a shift after
December 1999 from cash to equity payment for
takeovers with higher target institutional owner-
ship. To determine if this change is associated with
the size of target shareholder capital gains, model
1(a) is re-estimated for the two measures of capital
gains after including an additional interaction vari-
able between TGTINST*CHANGE and, respective-
ly, each measure of capital gains. The coefficient
on this additional variable is insignificant, whilst
the conclusions drawn from the other variables 
remained unchanged.
Acquiring firm overvaluation
As the acquiring firms’ market-to-book ratio is
generally insignificant in the estimation of model
(1), the findings presented provide little support
that acquiring firm overvaluation results in bid-
ding firms offering equity as payment. As an addi-
tional measure of acquiring firm overvaluation, we
calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal return
(BHAR) for bidding firms over the period com-
mencing two years before the takeover announce-
ment and ending two months prior to the takeover
announcement.11 Abnormal returns are calculated
by subtracting the return on the All Ordinaries
Accumulation Index from sample firm returns.
Each variant of model (1) is then re-estimated with
this additional variable. The coefficients on BHAR
are insignificant in all the regression models.
Inside ownership
Inconsistent with expectations, we do not find
any evidence that acquiring firm directors offer
cash as payment to avoid diluting their stake in the
acquiring firm. As Martin (1996) and Faccio and
Masulis (2005) find insider ownership is only as-
sociated with payment choice at medium levels of
ownership, we re-estimate model (1) after replac-
ing BIDDIROWN with a spline variable. Similar to
Martin (1996), low ownership is defined as a stake
of less than 5%, medium ownership is a stake of
5% to 25% and high ownership is a stake of
greater than 25%. The results (not tabulated) pro-
vide only limited support that insider voting rights
influence the payment method choice. Acquiring
firms with directors’ ownership below 5% are sig-
nificantly more likely (1% level) to offer equity
than cash (model 1(a)) and equity than mixed pay-
ment (model 1(b)) when capital gains are defined
on an unindexed basis. The coefficients on the
medium and high ownership levels are insignifi-
cant indicating that the dilution of existing owner-
ship rights is not an issue for bidding firm
management with higher levels of ownership. The
results on all other variables are similar to those
shown in Table 7. 
Method of payment and takeover outcome
Henry (2004) provides a comprehensive study of
factors that influence outcome in Australian
takeovers. The results of the study show no associ-
ation between payment method and the successful
completion of a takeover offer. For the takeovers
included in the method of payment choice tests,
we prepare a contingency table as a simple test of
the association between the payment method and
the takeover outcome. Similar to Henry (2004), we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no association
between the takeover outcome and the payment
form (χ22df = 1.12).
5. Conclusions and future research
It has been commonly hypothesised that share-
holder-level taxation is an important determinant
of the form of consideration offered in corporate
acquisitions. Prior studies in both Europe and the
US, however, have been unable to document an as-
sociation between the size of target shareholder
capital gains and payment method. Taking advan-
tage of a change to the CGT arrangements in
Australia, this study provides a direct test of the in-
fluence of shareholder level taxation on the
method of payment choice in takeovers.
Confirming the importance of shareholder level
taxation in the structure of corporate acquisitions,
we find a significant association between esti-
mates of target shareholder capital gains and the
payment form offered after the removal of the im-
mediate taxation of scrip-for-scrip exchanges in
December 1999. The results are, however, sensi-
tive to the proxy used to estimate capital gains.
Our results using an unindexed measure of capital
gain show a shift in acquisition structure for both
the full set of observations and those target firms
Vol. 38 No. 4. 2008 349
11 Abnormal returns are measured only until two months be-
fore the takeover announcement to ensure that any informa-
tion leakage surrounding the takeover is excluded.
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that have an average holding period of less than
three years. When we estimate capital gains using
an indexed measure, we only document a shift
from cash to equity payment for target firms that
have an average holding period of three years or
less. This study also documents that higher institu-
tional ownership in a target firm leads to a reduc-
tion in cash takeovers in favour of equity payment
subsequent to the regulatory change. This is con-
sistent with acquiring firms offering a payment
form that allows institutional owners to defer CGT.
Future research investigating the influence of
target shareholder capital gains on acquisition
structure may consider using a survey of acquiring
firms or takeover advisers to obtain greater appre-
ciation of the importance of target shareholder tax-
ation in choosing a payment form. For example,
such a survey can establish the importance and
ranking of target shareholder capital gains as a fac-
tor that bidding firms consider when choosing a
payment method. Additionally, the method em-
ployed by acquiring firms to calculate target share-
holder capital gains and the assumed holding
period of target shareholders can be more specifi-
cally determined.
In addition to investigating the influence of tar-
get shareholder taxation on payment method, this
study adds to prior research in Europe and the US
on factors that influence the method of payment
choice. The study shows that target firms with a
higher market-to-book ratio are more likely to be
offered equity. This finding is consistent with these
target firms having a higher degree of information
asymmetry and more uncertainty as to potential
synergies. Furthermore, we document that acquir-
ing firms with greater free cash flow and a higher
toehold stake are less likely to offer equity consid-
eration. Finally, a mixed payment type is more fre-
quently offered when the target firm is larger and
the takeover is friendly. This result is consistent
with these target firms having greater negotiating
power in relation to the bidding firm, thereby al-
lowing them to negotiate a mixed payment type for
their shareholders.
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